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Solidifying the Defensive Line:
The NFL Network's Current Position
Under Antitrust Law and How it
Can Be Improved
ABSTRACT
In the United States, the broadcasting of professional sporting
events is a multi-billion dollar industry, and the National Football
League (NFL) alone earned more than $3 billion from television
contracts during its 2008 season. Considering the massive revenues
that broadcast rights can generate, it is no surprise that some major
professional sports leagues have recently developed their own television
networks. While it was not the first league-owned television network,
the NFL Network has certainly generated the most attention. Since it
started broadcasting a select number of NFL regular season games in
2006, the NFL Network has been subject to media criticism, extensive
litigation, and even Congressional committee hearings.
There are potential antitrust concerns surrounding the Network
that are highlighted by an ongoing dispute between the NFL and cable
provider Comcast Corporation. Comcast offers the NFL Network on a
separate sports programming tier instead of on its basic cable package.
As a result, subscribers must pay extra for access to the Network, and it
reaches far fewer viewers than basic cable. The antitrust scrutiny
stems from uncertainty about whether the NFL Network (1) is exempt
from antitrust liability under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, and
(2) constitutes an agreement in restraint of trade in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act.
This Note first examines the analysis that a court is likely to use
in determining whether the NFL Network violates antitrust law. For
sports-related cases that involve potential antitrust liability under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts have applied the rule of reason
analysis and have looked to what effects the challenged conduct will
have on competition or consumer welfare. The NFL Network's impact
on competition and consumer welfare can be evaluated by considering
its role in the League's television policy, and how broadcasting games
on the Network actually affects consumers' access to NFL
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programming. Ultimately, the NFL Network may avoid antitrust
liability as long as it remains a supplement to the NFL's primary focus:
regional broadcasts of every NFL game on free, over-the-air networks.
In that way, games shown on the Network only increase consumer
access by giving viewers a way to pay for NFL programming that
would not otherwise be available in their market. Finally, this Note
proposes a flexible-scheduling policy that would address some of the
NFL Network's antitrust issues and ensure that consumer access to
NFL programming is enhanced.
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A national poll conducted in 1993 estimated that nearly 60
percent of all adults in the United States watched televised broadcasts
of National Football League (NFL) games.1 Since that time, the
popularity of the NFL has continued to grow, with roughly 222 million
people-or almost 75 percent of all Americans-watching on television
1. Phillip M. Cox II, Note, Flag on the Play? The Siphoning Effect on Sports
Television, 3 FED. COMM. L.J. 47 (1995).
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in 2006.2 With its growth in fan support, the League has enjoyed a
consistent increase in revenues. Recently, the NFL's net worth was
estimated to be $12.8 billion, which is nearly double that of the
professional sports league with the second highest net worth, Major
League Baseball (MLB).3 As one commentator has noted, "The NFL's
[television] ratings, attendance as a percentage of stadium capacity,
merchandise sales, Internet traffic, and overall fan affinity has left
every other professional sports league in the dust."
4
The NFL's success as a lucrative brand is likely correlated to
the development of broadcasting sporting events on television.
Professional sports leagues did not consider television broadcasts to be
a source of significant revenue until the late 1950s. 5 Since that time,
"[n]etwork television contracts have become the largest source of
revenue for sports franchises. '6 Indeed, the success of virtually all
professional sports leagues depends upon the marketing of the
broadcast rights to their games. 7 The NFL will generate more than $3
billion in 2008 from broadcast rights alone.8 This money is vital to the
League's survival, comprising approximately half of its total revenue
each year.9
2. Mike Lopresti, Parity Keys NFL's Popularity, USA TODAY, Sept. 5, 2007,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/lopresti/2007-09-05-lopresti-
nflN.htm.
3. Howard Bartee, The Role of Antitrust Laws in the Professional Sports Industry
From a Financial Perspective, 8 SPORT J. 2 (2005), available at
http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/role-antitrust-laws-professional-sports-industry-
financial-perspective.
4. Eric Fisher, MLB Can Learn from the NFL: The Game Would Benefit if
Owners/Players Emulated Their Football Counterparts, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Jan. 7,
2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/isl118/ai_82013564.
5. John A. Fortunato, The NBA Strategy of Broadcast Television Exposure: A Legal
Application, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 133, 134 (2001), available at
http://law.fordham.edu/publications/article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=1139 (noting that before
broadcast fees became a significant source of revenue, the NFL and other professional
sports leagues focused on game attendance and ticket revenues, and that, today, such
revenues are only a fraction of the NFL's total income).
6. Id. at 135.
7. Id.
8. See Can the NFL and Big Cable Cos. Get Beyond the Line of Scrimmage?,
KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, Apr. 9, 2008, at 2, http://knowledge.emory.edu/article.cfm
?articleid=l135 [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE@EMORY] (noting that the NFL has long-term
deals with CBS, NBC, and Fox, which have a combined value of more than $11 billion);
Marie Leone, NFL Runs Up the Score, CFO.COM, Jan. 30, 2008,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10600845?f=search (noting that additional contracts with
cable network ESPN and satellite broadcaster DirecTV are worth $8.9 billion and $3.5
billion, respectively.); see also Ted Hearn, NFL Files FCC Complaint Against Comcast,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 6, 2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article
/CA6558159.html.
9. Leone, supra note 8.
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A critical component in generating that income is the statutory
antitrust exemption provided to certain professional sports leagues
under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (SBA).' 0 Essentially, the
statute allows the NFL "to act as a cartel and collectively package and
sell the broadcast rights of its games to television networks."" The
NFL's development of its own network-the NFL Network (the
Network)-has raised new questions about the scope of the exemption,
and could possibly expose the League to antitrust scrutiny.' 2
Moreover, the relevance of these questions is not limited to the NFL.
Each one of the "big four" professional sports leagues in the United
States-the NFL, MLB, the National Basketball Association (NBA),
and the National Hockey League (NHL)-has developed a television
network that broadcasts league games. 13 Thus, this Note's analysis of
the antitrust issues surrounding the NFL Network can likely be
applied across the professional sports industry.
This Note will examine the antitrust issues surrounding the
NFL Network and propose a policy to address potential situations in
which the Network may be vulnerable to future antitrust scrutiny.
Part I will review the relevant antitrust law and its role in the
professional sports industry. Part II will discuss the current legal
dispute between Comcast and the NFL, which highlights the key
antitrust issues surrounding the NFL Network. Part III will
demonstrate why the NFL Network is not exempt from antitrust
liability under the SBA, and apply the relevant legal standard-
specifically, the "rule of reason" test, with a focus on consumer
welfare-in examining the Network's current position under antitrust
law. Finally, this Note will conclude that the NFL Network does not
violate antitrust law, and propose a flexible-scheduling policy that will
maintain the legality of the NFL's television policy and prevent future
antitrust liability.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2008).
11. Fortunato, supra note 5, at 133.
12. See, e.g., James J. LaRocca, No Trust at the NFL: League's Network Passes Rule
of Reason Analysis, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 87 (2008).
13. The networks of the "big four" professional sports leagues in the U.S. are: (1)
the NFL Network, (2) NBA TV; see David D. Kirkpatrick & Geraldine Fabrikant, A Cable
Network of Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, § 3, at 1; (3) the MLB Network; see David
B. Wilkerson, New MLB Network Bets Depth, Lore Will Appeal to Baseball Fans,
FoxBUSINESS, Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/industries/media
/new-mlb-network-bets-depth-lore-appeal-baseball-fans/; and (4) the NHL Network. See
Jon Lafayette, NHL Network Picked Up by Major U.S. Cable, Satellite Distributors,
TVWEEK, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.tvweek.com/news/2007/10/nhlnetwork
_picked.up-by-major.php.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Foundations of Antitrust Liability
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (the Sherman Act) was a
major legislative effort by the Fifty-first Congress to codify common
law prohibitions of anticompetitive conduct. 14 Enacted to protect
consumers, the Sherman Act targets market restraints that increase
price and decrease output, which are inherently "unresponsive to
consumer preference."'15 Under the Sherman Act, antitrust claims
come within federal jurisdiction, 16 and the consequences of a violation
can include criminal sanctions. 17 Virtually all contracts restrain trade
to some degree, so a workable standard was needed to target only the
agreements deserving of antitrust liability.18 The courts have adopted
a reasonableness standard so that the statute only prohibits
unreasonable restraints of trade.19
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is the antitrust provision that
primarily influences the NFL Network and the broadcasting of
professional sports in general. 20 It provides that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."21 Section 1 targets
agreements between two or more individuals or entities; it cannot be
violated by the unilateral action of a single actor. 22 There are two
basic methods of analyzing alleged Section 1 violations: (1) the per se
approach, and (2) the rule of reason approach.2 3 A per se violation will
14. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 17
(5th ed., 2004). The Sherman Act "enable[d] government agencies and private parties to
enforce prohibitions against trade restraints and monopolization." Id. at 27.
15. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
16. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 14, at 25.
17. Id. at 26-27.
18. See id. at 29.
19. Voluntary Trade Council, 6 VOLUNTARY TRADE REPORTS: FUMBLING THE
ANTITRUST FOOTBALL: THE NFL BLACKOUTS OF 2004-2005 3 (Dec. 2005).
20. See Lacie L. Kaiser, Note, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Sport
Leagues, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1237, 1240 (2005).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2008).
22. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 14, at 25-26.
23. Kaiser, supra note 20, at 1241; see also Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 66
(1911); U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291, 299 (6th Cir. 1898).
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generally be found by the courts for actions that, in all likelihood,
"would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output."24 In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected use of the per se approach in sports-related cases due to
their unique nature.
25
A court considering potential antitrust liability in a sports-
related case is therefore likely to judge the challenged conduct under
the rule of reason. Based on the 1911 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., modern applications of the rule of reason
test generally focus on the following elements in determining whether
there has been a violation of the Sherman Act: (1) collective action
must be shown through the existence of "a conspiracy or an agreement
among two or more persons," (2) there must be an intention or purpose
of such collective action to "restrain or harm competition," and (3) the
collective action must have actually succeeded in restraining or
harming competition. 26 Since the mid-1980s, the Court has applied a
modified version of the rule of reason test, often referred to as the
"consumer welfare test," in several antitrust cases."27  In Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., a case solidifying the consumer welfare test, the Court
acknowledged the importance of consumer welfare in U.S. antitrust
law,28 and characterized the Sherman Act as being "designed... as a
'consumer welfare prescription.' 29 The consumer welfare test looks at
whether the business practice at issue results in harm to consumer
24. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979). The U.S. Supreme
Court quickly realized that some antitrust cases could be resolved summarily, and the per
se test is applied to actions that are "presumed to have no benefit to competition in the
industry." Kaiser, supra note 20, at 1241. Thus, for business practices that satisfy the per
se test, no possible justifications can be supplied to defend their illegality. Id.
25. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-102 (1984); see
also, Kaiser, supra note 20, at 1241.
26. See Kaiser, supra note 20, at 1242; see also LaRocca, supra note 12, at 92-93
(stating that an antitrust violation is unlikely to be found "[i]f the procompetitive effects
outweigh the anticompetitive effects").
27. Ivy Ross Rivello, Sports Broadcasting in an Era of Technology: Superstations,
Pay-Per-View, and Antitrust Implications, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 187, 190 (1998) (noting
that the "Court has paralleled the term 'competition' with the term 'consumer welfare,"'
and the central focus of the inquiry-reasonableness in light of legitimate business
purposes-remains the same").
28. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (stating that limited vulnerability
to manipulated outcomes in antitrust cases is one of the main benefits of the consumer
welfare doctrine); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and
Antitrust Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 449 (2008).
29. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343 (quoting Robert H. Bork). The "consumer welfare
doctrine" is largely credited to Bork; however, it is not without its share of criticism. See
generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 107-
15 (1978).
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welfare.30  It is based on neoclassical economics, 31 which is the
predominant, "mainstream" view of economics today and "involves
economic agents . . . optimizing [value] subject to all relevant
constraints."
32
The policies underlying the antitrust exemption for
professional sports leagues in the SBA support the idea that any
detriment to "consumer welfare" would be an appropriate measure for
actual harm in an antitrust case that relates to a professional sports
franchise. Within the context of professional sports, courts should
apply the same focus on consumer welfare that was a driving force
behind the creation of the statutory exemption. Applying the
consumer welfare test to a case involving sports broadcasting, a court
would likely inquire whether the challenged conduct has a negative
impact on consumer access to the broadcasts of professional sporting
events.3 3 Because the output of a professional sports league is its
sporting events or games, "it is only collective decisions designed to
reduce the number of such games that threaten to diminish consumer
welfare within the meaning of rule of reason analysis."
34
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of
Regents provides the best example of the consumer welfare analysis in
the context of sports broadcast rights. 35 The Court held that the
NCAA's exclusive television policy amounted to a Section 1 violation of
the Sherman Act because it limited the number of college football
games that could be televised. 36 The Court rejected the use of the per
se test by the lower courts because the case involved "an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product
is to be available at all."37 Rather, the Court applied the rule of reason
30. Rivello, supra note 27, at 190; see also WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA,
THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 130-35
(2007) (providing an example of a consumer welfare analysis outside the context of sports
broadcasting).
31. Rivello, supra note 27, at 190.
32. E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1993), available at http://www.econlib.orgflibrary/Encl
/NeoclassicalEconomics.html.
33. See Rivello, supra note 27, at 190.
34. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity
Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 55-56 (1991), quoted in Rivello, supra
note 27, at 190 n.104.
35. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
36. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 95-96 (affirming the district court's holding that the NCAA
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
37. Id. at 101. The Court did point out, however, that the primary focus of the
analysis--"to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint"-was the
same under either test. Id. at 103 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
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test, under which a restraint of trade may be found unreasonable
based on one of the following: (1) "the nature or character of the
contracts," or (2) the "surrounding circumstances giving rise to the
inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade
and enhance prices. '38 The Court concluded that the challenged
conduct unreasonably restrained price and output,39 and found "that
by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to
respond to consumer preference, the NCAA ha[d] restricted rather
than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the nation's
life."40
From the holding in NCAA v. Board of Regents, it can be
inferred that when faced with an antitrust claim, professional sports
leagues may defend their challenged actions by showing that any
anticompetitive effects are outweighed by procompetitive benefits. 41
Indeed, there may be valid business reasons that justify an otherwise
prohibited restraint of competition. 42  The NCAA unsuccessfully
argued that its plan resulted in efficiencies, which increased the
competition for its broadcast rights.43  It also claimed that any
harmful effects were outweighed by the competitive balance that the
policy preserved. 44 Because it will generally maximize demand, the
purpose of maintaining competitive balance can be a justification
under the rule of reason analysis. 45 Nevertheless, the Court rejected
the NCAA's argument, as "[t]he finding that consumption will
materially increase if the controls are removed is a compelling
demonstration that they do not in fact serve any such legitimate
purpose."
46
38. Id. at 103.
39. Id. at 104-05. The Court found "significant potential for anticompetitive effects"
because the resulting price structure was "unresponsive to consumer preference" and not
the product of a competitive market. Id. at 105-07.
40. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
41. Kaiser, supra note 20, at 1241.
42. Id. Generally, exclusive dealing arrangements for the broadcasting of
professional sporting events will not run afoul of antitrust law or policy, provided such
broadcasts are freely accessible by the public. Exclusive Sports Programming: Examining
Competition and Consumer Choice: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Stephen F. Ross, Professor, Penn State
University's Dickinson School of Law), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=ba31ee64-810f-4e86-947e-
3ef4ddeO2Old&WitnessID=91f7b627-48fd-4ala-abfc-0448109b5f08.
43. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 119-20.
46. Id. at 120.
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2. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961
The SBA was enacted in 1961 as a legislative response to two
court rulings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.47 In the 1953
case U.S. v. NFL, Judge Allan K. Grim held that an NFL bylaw
provision, which prohibited individual teams from selling their
broadcast rights, was illegal under antitrust law. 48 But it was a 1961
ruling, however, that spurred Congress to action.49 At that time, the
NFL sought to execute a joint agreement with a television network for
the broadcast rights of all teams.50 Because of the 1953 ruling, the
NFL returned to the district court for a determination regarding the
new joint agreement. 51 Again, Judge Grim found the NFL's conduct to
be in violation of antitrust law and voided the agreement.5 2 Less than
three months later, Congress enacted the SBA. 53 It "established the
legality of the professional sports leagues' practice of packaging league
games to a network and not allowing teams to individually sell their
[broadcast] rights, which would otherwise be an unlawful restraint on
competition."
5 4
Under the SBA, an agreement facilitating the sale or transfer
of "sponsored telecast[s] of the games of football, baseball, basketball,
or hockey" by a professional sports league is exempt from the antitrust
laws. 55 This antitrust exemption is important because it facilitates
the bundling of broadcast rights, which provide the majority of the
league revenues. 56 The exemption is a limited one, however, applying
47. Fortunato, supra note 5, at 133; see generally U.S. v. NFL, 116 F.Supp. 319
(E.D. Pa. 1953); U.S. v. NFL, 196 F.Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
48. U.S. v. NFL, 116 F.Supp. at 319. Judge Grim did, however, allow the NFL to
retain a limited blackout privilege. Id. The purpose of the NFL bylaw was not to secure the
large revenues the League receives now, but rather to ensure that the relatively new
concept of televising games did not undermine ticket revenues or game attendance. See id.;
WTWV, Inc. v. NFL, 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982).
49. See U.S. v. NFL, 196 F.Supp. 445.
50. See id. A new competitor of the NFL-the American Football League-had
signed a similar agreement with a different television network. See WTWV, 678 F.2d at
142. In 1966 an agreement was reached for the American Football League to merge with
the NFL. NFL.COM, NFL History by Decade, http://www.nfl.comlhistory/chronology/1961-
1970 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
51. WTWV, 678 F.2d at 144.
52. U.S. v. NFL, 196 F.Supp. 445.
53. WTWV, 678 F.2d 142; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
54. Fortunato, supra note 5, at 139.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
56. See KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 1-2. For more regarding the
statutory antitrust exemption in the SBA, see Federal Statutory Exemptions from Antitrust
Law, 2007 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 217-21, 234-40.
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only to "the joint sale of television broadcast rights."57 Thus, antitrust
liability with respect to other areas-such as labor relations-is not
precluded by the exemption.
58
Uncertainty about the applicability of the SBA's exemption can
sometimes flow directly from changes that were unforeseen by
Congress in 1961. 59 Indeed, developments in technology have led to
legal challenges regarding the scope of the exemption because there is
little guidance from the statute itself.60 In Chicago Professional
Sports v. NBA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had
to decide whether superstations-particularly, WGN-TV of Chicago-
should be allowed to broadcast NBA games contrary to the league's
legal monopoly over the broadcast rights to its games.61 Superstations
are local broadcast stations that have national exposure "because
cable systems throughout the nation carry [the] signal."62 WGN-TV
challenged an NBA policy restricting the national broadcast of games
by superstations. 63  The Seventh Circuit decided the antitrust
exemption was not applicable because, according to the court, it
should be construed narrowly, and the challenged conduct did not
involve the "transfer" of broadcast rights.64 Applying the rule of
reason test, Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the court, upheld
the decision of the lower court to enjoin the NBA from enforcing the
broadcast restrictions.
65
The development of satellite television is a more recent
example of how new technology has raised questions about the SBA
exemption. 66 In Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether the
antitrust exemption applied to the joint sale of broadcast rights to a
satellite television distributor.67 The NFL had collectively agreed to
sell its broadcast rights to DirecTV, which the plaintiffs claimed was a
57. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (1983).
58. See id.
59. E.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999);
Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
60. See, e.g., Shaw, 172 F.3d at 299; Competition in Sports Programming and
Distribution: Are Consumers Winning?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 17 (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:32152.pdf [hereinafter S. Hrg. 109-
762].
61. 961 F.2d at 667.
62. Id. at 669.
63. See id. at 669-70.
64. See id. at 670-71.
65. Id. at 674-77.
66. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999).
67. Id.
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violation of the Sherman Act. 68 The court determined the agreement
was not covered by the exemption, as a satellite distributor did not fall
under the statutory language of "sponsored telecasting."69  It
interpreted "sponsored telecasts" to mean "broadcasts which are
financed by business enterprises ... in return for advertising time and
are therefore provided free to the general public."70  Due to a
settlement in the case, however, the ultimate issue-whether the
agreement with DirecTV actually violated the antitrust laws-was
never resolved by the court.7 1
So why is the antitrust exemption important? The simple
answer has been articulated by Emory University Professor Steve
Walton: "If the sports leagues lose that exemption, they [are] toast."72
To understand why the exemption is necessary for the NFL to survive,
one must look at its business model. 73 Perhaps the best explanation is
that given by the Second Circuit in North American Soccer League v.
NFL:
The success of professional football as a business depends on several factors. The
ultimate goal is to attract as many people as possible to pay money to attend
games between members [teams] and to induce advertisers to sponsor television
broadcasts of such games, which results in box-office receipts . . . all based on
public interest in viewing games.
74
Without the antitrust exemption, leagues would be prohibited
from bundling the broadcast rights of its teams.7 5 The rights would
then be sold by the teams individually, and the networks would be
able to "cherry-pick" games featuring only the top teams and star
players, which might lead to some teams' games not being broadcasted
on television at all. To increase popularity and generate greater
revenues, however, the NFL seeks to maximize exposure for all teams
through the sale of its broadcast rights.
7 6
68. See id. at 300.
69. Id. at 302-03.
70. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). The court followed "the Supreme Court's direction
that exceptions to the antitrust laws must be narrowly construed." Id. While
acknowledging that the NFL retains some rights in the games that are televised, the court
concluded that "the statutory exemption turns on the nature of the broadcast in question."
Id. at 300.
71. Voluntary Trade Council, supra note 19, at 14.
72. KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 1-2. Walton points out that the survival
of the NFL depends on the revenue generated under its antitrust exemption, and losing it
"would be an utter catastrophe." Id. at 2.
73. See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1982).
74. Id.
75. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1291; U.S. v. NFL, 116 F.Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
76. See KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 1-2 (noting that allowing the NFL to
bundle broadcast rights under the SBA exemption means that purchasers of those rights
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II. CASE STUDY: NFL v. COMCAST
A. The NFL Network Dispute
The NFL Network has generated some antitrust scrutiny,
which is highlighted by the NFL's public standoff with a major cable
provider. 77 The League is currently engaged in a fierce legal battle
against Comcast Corporation (Comcast) over the program carriage
rights of the Network. 78 Launched in 2003, the Network was initially
designed to provide highlights, analysis, and programming that
included a continuous dose of "archived footage, football-focused
specials and old team highlight reels."79 Cable companies gave the
Network a lukewarm reception due to concerns that it lacked the
programming content to appeal to a broader audience.8 0 Nevertheless,
the NFL and Comcast entered an agreement giving the cable provider
the right to broadcast the NFL Network to its subscribers.81 The
agreement contained a clause, however, allowing Comcast to offer the
Network as part of any of its cable packages, provided there was no
subsequent agreement for an "additional cable package" executed by
the parties before July 31, 2006.82
The NFL eventually decided to broadcast regular season games
on the Network.8 3 On July 28, 2006, the League reached a deal with
Comcast regarding the specific games available for broadcast via the
NFL Network.8 4 Soon thereafter, Comcast announced that it would
place the NFL Network on its sports tier, which requires subscribers
to pay an extra monthly fee for access.8 5 As a result, the NFL
are forced to pay for the weaker teams along with those teams that may be more
profitable.).
77. See id. at 1.
78. See generally NFL Enters. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, No. 603469/06, 2007
WL 1299412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2007), aff'd, 51 A.D.3d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
79. KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 2. The NFL Network also featured live
broadcasts of some preseason (and now defunct) NFL Europe games. Rick Horrow, Sports
on TV Strategies for the New Millenium, SPORTSLINE.COM, Nov. 4, 2003, available at
http://www.dartfish.com/floor/download.cgi?file=/data/documentldocument/43.pdf
&name=SportsLine.com.
80. KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 1.
81. Aaron S. Glass, 2007 Annual Survey: Recent Developments in Sports Law, 18
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 355 (2008).
82. Id. In other words, any agreement by the parties for an "additional cable
package" would require Comcast to place the NFL Network on its basic cable lineup. See id.
83. See LaRocca, supra note 12, at 87.
84. Id.; see also KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 2.
85. LaRocca, supra note 12, at 87-88.
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Network is available to only 1 million Comcast subscribers who have
purchased the additional sports programming tier, instead of the 24
million subscribers of Comcast's basic cable.8 6 The NFL responded by
filing a lawsuit against Comcast in December 2007, claiming that its
agreement with the cable provider did not permit placement of the
NFL Network on a "separate pay-basis 'sports tier."'8 7 The NFL also
filed a program carriage complaint with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in May 200888, and created a massive public
relations campaign encouraging NFL fans to increase pressure on
Comcast to include the Network on basic cable.8 9 The case went to
trial in 2007, and a New York state court granted summary judgment
for Comcast, finding that there was "not a deal for an additional
package."90  In February 2008, however, the Appellate Division
reversed the decision. 9' It concluded that the ambiguity of the
contractual terms created a genuine issue of material fact, and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 92 In the Fall of 2008, the
parties agreed to mediation; however, it appears unlikely that an
86. Hearn, supra note 8.
87. Glass, supra note 81, at 355.
88. Hearn, supra note 8. The complaint alleged that Comcast's dealings with the
NFL Network constituted discriminatory and retaliatory action in violation of federal law.
Id. Even when the NFL's suit against Comcast went to mediation in August 2008, the
League did not suspend its pending complaint. The FCC issued a decision in favor of the
NFL on October 10, 2008, refusing to dismiss the complaint and sending it to an
administrative law judge for review. Richard Sandomir, NFL Network Gets a Lift from
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at SP4, available at http://www.nytimes.com2008/10/12
/sports/football12cable.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
89. KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 2. The NFL created a website-
iwantmynflnetwork.com-that encouraged fans to contact their local government officials
or even switch to other cable providers. See Comcast Sends NFL Network Cease-and-Desist
Note, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl
/2007-11-20-comcast-letterN.htm. Comcast responded by sending the League a cease-and-
desist letter. See id. As of April 2009, the Internet domain name appears to have been
changed to iwantnflnetwork.com. See I Want NFL Network, http://iwantnflnetwork.com/
(last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
90. NFL Enters. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, 51 A.D.3d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
According to the NFL, its agreement with Comcast on July 28, 2006, regarding the specific
games to be broadcast on the Network qualified as one for an "additional cable package"
and fell within the scope of the contractual deadline. Glass, supra note 81, at 355. Comcast,
on the other hand, argued that said agreement merely amended the original agreement
with the League. Id. The court's ruling allowed Comcast to continue its placement of the
NFL Network on a separate sports tier. See id.
91. NFL Enters. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, No. 603469/06, 2007 WL 1299412
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4,2007), affld, 51 A.D.3d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
92. Id. at 61-62.
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agreement will be reached before the current deal expires on April 30,
2009.
93
B. Potential Antitrust Issues
Although this case involves a contractual issue between
Comcast and the NFL, it highlights potential antitrust issues
surrounding the NFL Network, which could have far greater
implications for the League.94 Members of Congress have already
threatened the NFL Network's legitimacy under antitrust law.
95
Specific legislation has been proposed that would eliminate or severely
restrict the NFL's antitrust exemption. 96 According to the NFL, a
repeal of the SBA-resulting in the sale of broadcast rights by
individual teams-would harm output and severely limit consumer
choice. 97 The NFL claims that, without the exemption, "several NFL
teams may well .. .ceasen operations due to their inability to obtain
sufficient exposure and revenue from television."98  The stakes are
high. Yet, the NFL is no stranger to Capitol Hill, spending $380,000
and $1,125,000 on federal lobbying in 2006 and 2007, respectively. 99
Perhaps the most significant congressional action on this issue
to date was a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing led by Senator
Arlen Specter, Republican from Pennsylvania, in November 2006.100
The committee sought to examine possible antitrust violations by the
93. See Hearn, supra note 8; Donna Goodison, Clock Ticking on NFL Network,
Comcast Deal, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 1, 2009, (Finance), at 24; see also supra text
accompanying note 88.
94. While the NFL's legal battle with Comcast has received the most publicity, the
dispute over the NFL Network is not limited to Comcast alone. Indeed, in 2008 the NFL
Network was still inaccessible to 60 percent of all cable subscribers in the United States.
KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 2. Furthermore, the move by a professional sports
league to have its own exclusive network is not unique to the NFL. All four major
professional sports leagues have developed some form of television network. See supra text
accompanying note 13.
95. See Brooks Boliek, Senate Panel Puts NFL on Defense, THR, ESQ., Nov. 15,
2006, http://www.allbusiness.com/services/legal-services/4466737-1.html.
96. See generally John Lewin, NFL TV Blackouts: In Defense of Congress and Arlen
Specter, BLEACHER REP., June 6, 2008, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/27928-nfl-tv-
blackouts-in-defense-of-congress-and-arlen-specter. However, congressional action on this
issue is unlikely to take place anytime soon. See Fisher, supra note 4. Indeed, there are a
number of important issues requiring the attention of Congress, and many members are
simply indifferent about the issue. Id.
97. S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 32.
98. Id. at 64.
99. Rick Cohen, Playing by the NFL's Tax Exempt Rules, COHEN REP., Aug. 14,
2008, http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/cohenreport/2008/08/14/playing-by-the-nfls-tax-
exempt-rules/.
100. See S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 1.
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NFL Network and focused on deals that would allow the NFL to
"either grant exclusivity to one carrier or another or dictate the tier on
which cable operators can place pro football programming." 10 1 Senator
Specter was primarily concerned that by forcing its Network to be
included on basic cable packages, the NFL would unfairly impose
unnecessary costs on cable subscribers who may not want access.
10 2
During the hearing, Senator Specter raised the following question:
"Well, where you have the NFL in effect raising prices and limiting
distribution [through its development of the NFL Network] without
any countervailing reasons for it, don't you have a violation of the
Sherman Act rule of reason?"10 3 The issue has not gone away in the
time since the 2006 hearing. As recently as October 2008, several U.S.
senators have sent the NFL a letter calling for "greater access to
games shown on the league-owned NFL Network."'0 4 However, the
NFL has taken the position that its legal dispute with Comcast can
and should be resolved without government interference. 10 5 It also
insists that its television policy is consistent with antitrust law, and
that no antitrust issues are created by its dispute with Comcast.
0 6
The NFL's television programming is divided into three
categories. The most important category is free over-the-air
broadcasting. 0 7 Every NFL game during the regular season and
playoffs is provided on free, over-the-air television in at least one
market.'08 Second, the NFL Sunday Ticket on DirecTV is "a satellite
package that allows fans to view out-of-market games that would not
otherwise be available in their home community."'0 9 By subscribing to
the Sunday Ticket, a fan can watch any NFL game broadcast. It was
101. Boliek, supra note 95. The hearing also focused on the validity of the League's
NFL Sunday Ticket package on DirecTV. See S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60 passim.
102. S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 6-7. In response, the NFL argued that broad
distribution was in the public interest, and that there would not necessarily be added costs
to the consumers. See id. It pointed to the fact that DirecTV and EchoStar provided the
NFL Network on their basic packages at no added cost to subscribers. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Ted Hearn, Senators Blitz NFL's Local TV Policy, MULTICHANNEL NEwS, Oct.
29, 2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6609814.html.
105. S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 6.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 5. Congress ordered a 1994 study by the FCC into the validity of the
NFL's television policy under the SBA. Id. at 64. Finding NFL operations consistent with
the public interest, the FCC report concluded that no amendments limiting the application
of the SBA were needed. Id. at 64-65.
108. Id. at 5 (noting testimony of NFL Executive Jeffrey Pash that "[e]very NFL
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developed to supplement, rather than replace, the free over-the-air
broadcasts. 1 0  The third programming category is the NFL
Network."' The eight regular season games currently shown on the
Network each season are also available through free over-the-air
broadcasts in the home markets of the teams involved. 1 2 With access
to cable television becoming more common, the NFL Network has the
potential to maintain national exposure while making the League less
dependent on the bids of a few major broadcast companies. Despite
the potential, however, Comcast's current arrangement with the NFL
has left the Network on a separate programming tier with limited
viewership.
The other professional sports leagues that depend upon the
antitrust exemption to the Sherman Act are not immune to the issues
surrounding the NFL Network.113  Thus, absent the SBA, all
professional sports leagues in the United States may be vulnerable to
prosecution under federal antitrust law by continuing their current
practice of bundling the broadcast rights of their constituent team
franchises.11 4  Given the massive popularity professional sports
currently enjoy, the debate over the proper treatment that antitrust
110. Id. In other words, a fan will not have to buy the NFL Sunday Ticket to watch
playoff games or any game broadcast in his home market.
111. See id. at 6.
112. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying note 94. The NBA's network, NBA TV, was
launched in November 1999. John Ourand & John Lombardo, Turner Promotes NBA
Digital Menu, SPORTS Bus. J., Oct. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/60197. In fact, the NBA was the pioneer of
league-owned networks, becoming the first professional sports league to develop its own
television network. Id. Like the NFL Network, NBA TV offers viewers live regular season
game, highlights, news, and analysis on a continual basis. See generally NBA.com: NBA
TV, http://www.nba.com/nbatv/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). Prior to 2007 most
cable companies relegated NBA TV to a separate sports programming tier. See id. It is now
included in the basic digital package from Time Warner Cable, which increased subscriber
exposure by 60 percent. Id. MLB took a different approach by offering live broadcasts on an
online subscription service called MLB.TV. M.G. Siegler, MLB.TV Strikes Out with
Premium Online Video, VENTURE BEAT DIGITAL MEDIA, Apr. 2, 2008,
http://venturebeat.com/2008/04/02/mlbtv-strikes-out-with-premium-online-video/. For a
monthly subscription fee, consumers can watch broadcasts of games that were not televised
in their markets. Id. MLB has recently given MLB.TV a supplemental role in its overall
media package and announced the development of a new television network. See generally
The Official Site of Major League Baseball, http://www.mlb.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
The MLB Network launched on January 1, 2009. See MLB Network,
http://mlb.mlb.com/network/about (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). Like the networks of its fellow
leagues, the MIB Network offers 'live games, original programming, highlights, classic
games, and coverage of baseball events." Id.
114. S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60.
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law should give the structural decisions made in this industry is very
important. 11
5
III. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF THE NFL NETWORK
Before examining possible antitrust violations, it must be
determined whether the NFL Network is protected from antitrust
liability by the SBA exemption. If so, the subsequent analysis of a
Section 1 violation of the Sherman Act becomes moot. Conversely, if
the NFL Network is outside the scope of the exemption, the NFL may
risk antitrust liability. The potential illegality of the NFL's actions is
not lost on the cable companies. 116 At least one cable provider has
suggested that "the launch of the NFL Network, which could take
games away from many fans unless cable companies pick it up, is a
'monopolistic and predatory practice."'11 7
A. The SBA Exemption Unlikely to Cover the NFL Network
A court would probably find that the NFL Network is outside
the scope of the SBA antitrust exemption for several reasons. First,
the language of the exemption itself clearly states that only
"sponsored" telecasts are covered. 118 This term has traditionally been
interpreted to mean "free over-the-air broadcasts," which derive their
revenues from paid advertisements. 19  Until recently, the NFL
acquiesced in this interpretation. In the legislative record of the SBA,
then-NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle acknowledged that the
exemption "covered only the free telecasting of professional sports
contests and does not cover pay TV."120  Several years later another
NFL commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, conceded before a Senate
Committee that the term "sponsored telecasts" does not include "pay
115. Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues
Should Look More Like McDonald's and Less Like the United Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 213, 220 (2006).
116. See KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 2.
117. Id. at 2. According to Time Warner Cable, the fees that would be charged for
carrying the NFL Network are "in the top five in terms of how expensive it would be
[relative to the other networks Time Warner carries] .... [However,] the ratings [of the
NFL Network] .. . are not even in the top thirty." S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 15.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2009) (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir.
1999). The House Antitrust Subcommittee determined that the SBA "does not apply to
closed circuit or subscription television." Id.
120. Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearings on H.R. 8757 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 36 (1961), quoted in
Cox, supra note 1, at 576 (emphasis added).
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and cable .... This is clear from the legislative history and from the
committee reports."'
121
The statements of the former commissioners notwithstanding,
the NFL now claims that the SBA does in fact "coverf the joint sale of
television rights to cable and satellite providers, whose offerings can
and should be viewed as 'sponsored telecasts' within the meaning of
the statute."'122 As a broadcast medium owned by a professional sports
league, the NFL Network is another example of new developments in
this industry that were unforeseen by Congress when the SBA was
enacted. 123  In two notable cases-Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys and
Chicago Professional Sports v. NBA-it was determined that the SBA
exemption does not cover satellite television or superstations,
respectively. 24 However, a court has not considered whether the SBA
exemption applies to a league-owned network specifically. In Shaw,
the Third Circuit concluded that "the [SBA] statutory exemption turns
on the nature of the broadcast in question."'125 Thus, the NFL
Network's position that it is exempt from antitrust liability under the
SBA is not automatically foreclosed; indeed, in the past, federal courts
have sometimes interpreted the SBA in a manner favoring the NFL. 26
Although the scope of the SBA exemption has traditionally
been interpreted as covering free broadcasts only, it has not stopped
the NFL and other professional sports leagues from "selling pooled
telecast rights to many cable networks without legal challenge."'127
Based on the law's lack of response to the general practice of
transferring broadcast rights to cable networks, the NFL could
potentially argue that the "restrictive view of the scope of the [SBA]
has changed with the proliferation of cable television."'128 The NFL
Network's current status, however, likely precludes the success of any
argument based on the proliferation of cable television.129 The vast
majority of the 41 million consumers who have access to the Network
121. LaRocca, supra note 12, at 91-92 (quoting PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS,
SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS 635-36 (3d ed. 2004)).
122. S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 32.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 59-70.
124. See Shaw, 172 F.3d at 299-303; Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 669-76 (7th Cir. 1992).
125. Shaw, 172 F.3d at 300.
126. See, e.g., Alan Fecteau, NFL Network Blackouts: Old Law Meets New
Technology with the Advent of the Satellite Dish, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 221, 235 (1995)
(discussing a case in which a court 'loosely interpreted the [SBA] for the benefit of NFL
blackout rules").
127. Cox, supra note 1, at 576.
128. Id.
129. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 107-112.
[Vol. 11:3:637
SOLIDIFYING THE DEFENSIVE LINE
come from satellite television distributors.13 0  Thus, it would be
extremely difficult for the NFL to distinguish its wholly owned
network from satellite television, which the Third Circuit concluded
was beyond the scope of the SBA exemption in Shaw.131 As long as
satellite television is the primary way for consumers to access the
Network, it is unlikely that a court will agree with the NFL's position
in light of Shaw.13 2 Even if the NFL Network could be characterized
as a cable network like ESPN, it is not certain that the league's
argument for exemption under the SBA would be successful. While
the Third Circuit's ruling in Shaw involved satellite television, one
can reasonably interpret it as supporting the position that only free
over-the air broadcasts are exempt under the SBA.133
Finally, while the NFL may wish to read the statute
differently, there is a general principle that antitrust exemptions
should be construed narrowly.134 The SBA exemption is no exception
to the rule, and a court is unlikely to interpret it in a manner that
expands coverage beyond the plain meaning of its language. 3 5
Moreover, the likelihood of liberal construction by a court is even more
remote where, like the SBA, it would contradict the congressional
intent that is clearly presented in the legislative history. 36 Despite
the subsequent changes that have taken place in sports and
technology, Congress has not found it necessary to amend or update
the statutory exemption. Thus, the general principle of construing
antitrust exemptions narrowly supports the conclusion that the NFL
Network is not immune from antitrust liability. 137 Based on the
foregoing, the SBA antitrust exemption does not apply to the NFL
130. See Richard Sandomir, NFL Network Hopes ESPN Is Answer to Its Problems,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at D8; S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 72 (estimating that 40
million consumers had access to the NFL Network during 2006-2007 NFL season).
131. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 172 F.3d 299, 300-03 (3d Cir. 1999).
132. See id. at 300-02.
133. See id. at 299-302; Voluntary Trade Council, supra note 19, at 12-14. In other
words, a court may conclude that, under Shaw, any sale of broadcast rights not provided
free to the general public will fall outside the scope of the SBA exemption. See LaRocca,
supra note 12, at 91-92. Although a settlement precluded the court from deciding on the
alleged antitrust violation, Shaw is widely accepted as taking the position that only free
over-the-air broadcasts are exempt under the SBA. E.g., Voluntary Trade Council, supra
note 19, at 13.
134. See, e.g., Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d
667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1992). This case may also support a narrower, yet potentially valid,
argument that the exemption only applies to "transfers" of broadcast rights. See id. at 670-
71; 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2009).
135. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126-29 (1982);
Shaw, 172 F.3d at 301.
136. See, supra notes 64, 69-70 and accompanying text.
137. See generally Pireno, 458 U.S. at 126-29; Shaw, 172 F.3d at 301.
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Network; unless Congress alters or expands the SBA, the Network is
not exempt from antitrust liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
by way of the SBA alone. Just because the Network is not exempt,
however, does not necessarily mean that it violates antitrust law.
B. Applying the Rule of Reason Test to the NFL Network
"[T]he Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only unreasonable
restraints of trade,"' 38 and the NFL Network must satisfy this
reasonableness standard if allegations of antitrust violations are to be
dismissed. Because the NFL "involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to
be available at all,"'139 the per se analysis would be inappropriate.'
40
Consistent with judicial treatment of alleged antitrust violations in
sports-related cases, the rule of reason test, as outlined in Part I.A. 1 of
this Note, should be used to determine whether the NFL Network
violates the Sherman Act.141 The three elements required for a
Section 1 violation are: (1) collective action; (2) a purpose to restrain
competition; and (3) actual harm to consumer welfare that is not
balanced or outweighed by procompetitive benefits.142
1. Collective Action
The first element of the rule of reason test is collective action.
The NFL is structured as a trade association, with each of the thirty-
two member teams operating as a separate business yet sharing the
overall revenue. 143 Because Section 1 of the Sherman Act only applies
to "agreements," not unilateral action, the NFL could probably avoid
liability under that provision if it is considered, at least for antitrust
purposes, a single entity. 144 As a result, the League has consistently
argued for its single-entity status.145  The high level of
interdependence among league members has been cited by many as
138. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)
(emphasis added).
139. Id. at 101.
140. See id. at 100-01.
141. See id. at 100-03; discussion supra Part I.A.1.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
143. Google Finance, National Football League, http://finance.google.com/finance?cid
=12892298 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). Existing separately from the League, NFL
Enterprises, LLC is an affiliate of the NFL that "owns and operates" the NFL Network.
NFL Enters. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, 51 A.D.3d 52, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
144. Brion Doherty, Note, NFL Stadiums and Antitrust: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 56-57 (2007).
145. Id. at 56.
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grounds for treating sports leagues as single-entities under antitrust
law. 146 However, "[t]he courts have acknowledged that sports leagues
are a unique form of economic organization along the lines of a joint
venture."'147 The fact that each NFL team is owned and operated
independently, sharing only a percentage of overall revenues, means
the League is probably not a single entity under antitrust law.
148
Indeed, if the League were a single entity, there would be no reason
for the SBA exemption. Thus, the NFL has not traditionally been
considered to be able to exploit a "single entity defense" to alleged
antitrust violations, and the "collective action" requirement would
likely be satisfied for a Section 1 claim against the NFL Network.
1 49
2. Purpose to Restrain Competition
The second element required for a court to find a Section 1
violation is a purpose to restrain competition. Like the NCAA, the
NFL holds a regulatory role in its sport by establishing and enforcing
eligibility standards, playing rules, and operational guidelines.' 50 The
television policy held illegal in NCAA v. Board of Regents sought to
limit the "adverse effects" to "football game attendance" thought to
result from the television broadcasts of college football. 51 Similarly,
the NBA policy enjoined by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Professional Sports v. NBA was restrictive in nature and limited the
broadcasting of NBA games. 152 The NFL's television policy, on the
other hand, seeks to maximize exposure. Because the purpose of the
146. Rivello, supra note 27, at 182.
147. Id. at 183.
148. Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable
Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 466, 468 (1990) ("Indeed, the [SBA's] antitrust exemption...
would have been entirely unnecessary if the single entity argument was valid in this
context.").
149. Additionally, the NFL's tax-exempt status will not protect it from antitrust
liability. In Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[tihere is no doubt that the sweeping language of Section 1 [of the
Sherman Act] applies to nonprofit entities . . . and in the past we have imposed antitrust
liability on nonprofit entities which have engaged in anticompetitive conduct. 468 U.S. 85,
100 n.22 (1984).
150. See id. at 88 (addressing the NCAA's "important role in the regulation of
amateur collegiate sports").
151. Id. at 91. To this end, the NCAA sought to share television exposure among
member teams. Id. at 92 n.6. There was a limit placed on the number of times each team
could play a televised game. See id. at 92 n.7.
152. See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 669
(7th Cir. 1992).
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NFL Network is to increase output and promote the NFL,153 it is
easily distinguished from the improper purpose featured in NCAA v.
Board of Regents, which was largely a protectionist motive that sought
to limit output. 154
While the NFL may truly believe that its television policy
promotes the public interest, "it is nevertheless well settled that good
motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice.
'155
The NFL Network will be subject to an objective "reasonableness"
standard, and good faith is not considered a valid defense. 156 If a court
finds that the purpose of the Network is "reasonable in light of the
legitimate business purposes of the league as a whole,"157 the plaintiff
cannot satisfy the "purpose" element required for a successful claim
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. According to the NFL, it is not
the Network itself that conflicts with antitrust law, but the
restrictions placed on the Network by cable companies-in other
words, keeping it on a separate programming tier-that create
restraints on competition by "interfer[ing] with the [NFL]'s mission to
distribute [its] games broadly."
158
When faced with antitrust questions, the NFL has justified the
supplemental elements of its television policy-the NFL Sunday
Ticket on DirecTV and the NFL Network on Comcast cable
television-by claiming that they provide the following benefits: (1)
enhanced competition in the television market; (2) increased output by
making more games available to fans; and (3) a supplement, rather
than replacement, of the primary focus on free over-the-air
broadcasts. 159 Each one of the "big four" professional sports leagues in
the U.S. has its own television network, and the NFL Network is an
important part of the League's television policy.160 Given the
153. See Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th
Cong. 5 (2008) (written testimony of Roger Goodell, Comm'r, Nat'l Football League),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte-mtgs/1 10-ti-hrg.030508.Goodell-
testimony.pdf.
154. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 91, 96, 119.
155. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 n.23.
156. Id. at 101 n.23.
157. Rivello, supra note 27, at 190.
158. LaRocca, supra note 12, at 89. Notwithstanding the NFL's position, the League
insists that its "commercial negotiations" with Comcast should be left to the market and
free from congressional intervention. S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 75.
159. See S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 75.
160. See KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8, at 2-3 (noting that, by targeting a
league's marketing efforts to specific consumer segments, the networks of professional
sports leagues can "narrowly define who they speak to, then serve those audiences like no
other network can").
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popularity of NFL games, it does not seem unreasonable for the league
to place a small package of games on its new network "in light of [its]
legitimate business purposes."161 Ultimately, the reasonableness of
the Network under antitrust law will depend on its actual competitive
effects.
3. Actual Harm to Consumer Welfare
The third element in an antitrust violation analysis is actual
harm to competition or consumer welfare. Under NCAA v. Board of
Regents, challenged conduct will generally violate Section 1 if
competitors "createf a horizontal restraint-an agreement among
[them] on the way in which they will compete with one another."162
Such agreements generally have the effect of placing a limit on supply
that is unresponsive to consumer demand. 163 Because every NFL
game is televised in at least one market, consumer access can be an
effective measure of competitive effects. By defining output in terms
of consumer welfare, the competitive effects of the NFL Network can
be accurately determined without compromising the general
application of the Court's analysis in NCAA v. Board of Regents.164
For the purposes of this analysis, consumer welfare can be said to
increase when consumers (or viewers) have greater access to the
television broadcasts of NFL games. This is consistent with the
methodology advanced by Professor Stephen F. Ross for joint transfers
of broadcast rights to cable networks generally, which focuses on
"whether viewership is lower because of the challenged conduct than it
would be if that contract were enjoined."'165 Ross argues that "[w]hen
such agreements reduce viewership, they constitute unreasonable
restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
should be enjoined."1 66  Therefore, in analyzing whether televising
games on the NFL Network actually harms viewership, it is necessary
161. Rivello, supra note 27, at 190.
162. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984).
163. See id. Just as the NCAA was found to have market power in televised college
football, the NFL can reasonably be said to have market power in professional football
telecasts. See id. at 111-12.
164. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Sherman Act was
developed by Congress as a "consumer welfare prescription." Id. at 107, quoted in LaRocca,
supra note 12, at 95.
165. Ross, supra note 148, at 477-78. For purposes of this analysis, the terms
"viewership" and "consumer access" are synonymous.
166. Id. at 464.
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to determine the output, or viewership, that would likely exist if the
Network was enjoined from broadcasting live games.
167
The NFL reportedly decided to forego $400 million in revenue
by reserving for its Network the broadcast rights of the eight-game
package. 168 It follows that other networks were willing to purchase
the rights had they not been reserved to the NFL Network under the
League's current television policy. 169 For all three free over-the-air
networks that aired national broadcasts of NFL games in 2007 (CBS,
NBC, and Fox), there was an average of more than 15.9 million
viewers for each broadcast. 170 Cable network ESPN averaged 11.2
million viewers in 2007 for its exclusive Monday Night Football
broadcasts, down from 12.3 million in 2006.171 By contrast, the games
televised on the NFL Network in 2006 and 2007 only averaged 3.1
million and 4.6 million viewers, respectively. 172 Clearly, the national
over-the-air networks have a much larger presence than the NFL
Network-but if the NFL Network did not broadcast the games, is it
likely that the net viewership would actually increase?
The statistics provided above for the over-the-air networks
measure the "national-window games" only.173 These games are free
national broadcasts and are limited to two Sunday afternoon games
(CBS and Fox) and one Sunday night game (NBC) during each week of
the NFL regular season.1 74 So while it is technically true that every
NFL game is broadcast on free over-the-air television, viewers do not
have free access to every game. If they did, there would be no need for
the supplemental elements of the NFL's television policy, much less
any antitrust issues surrounding the broadcasts. Not counting
ESPN's "Monday Night Football" on cable, viewers will have free over-
167. See id. at 464-65; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. 85.
168. Adam Thompson, NFL vs. Cable Is Turning into a Real Nailbiter, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 14, 2006, at B1; see also S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 16. While $400 million may
seem like a substantial amount of money to turn down, the $1.1 billion the NFL receives
from ESPN each year for Monday Night Football helps put the offer in perspective.
169. See generally Thompson, supra note 168.
170. Street & Smith's SportsBusiness Daily, Final Nielsen Ratings for NFL Regular
Season, https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/117479 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). The




174. See id.; Posting of Oldheadl to GroundReport, NFL TV Recap: 225 Million
Americans Watched, http://www.groundreport.com/ArtsandCulture/NFL-TV-Recap-225-
Million-Americans-Watched_2 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). In the past, a free national
broadcast of an NFL game was available each Monday night during the regular season, but
this package has recently moved to cable network ESPN. See NFL on Television -
Wikipedia, http:llen.wikipedia.org/wiki/NFLon_television (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
[Vol. 11:3:637
SOLIDIFYING THE DEFENSIVE LINE
the-air access to no more than three "national-window games" each
week, and the only other free access for viewers will be a regional
broadcast of the team(s) in their home market. 175 Traditionally,
national broadcasts of NFL games occur on either Sunday or Monday
nights. 176 The games televised on the NFL Network are played on
Thursday nights, and a free over-the-air regional broadcast is still
provided in the home markets of both teams.1
77
In reality, while the NFL Network requires consumers to pay
for access, the Network actually increases net viewership. Because
the NFL can decide not to broadcast games on Thursday nights, it can
legitimately argue that such an agreement actually increases
output.'7 8 Even though the broadcast rights could have been sold for
$400 million, there is no guarantee that the games would remain on
Thursday nights. Most likely, the games would be moved back to
Sundays, consistent with the schedule that existed prior to the NFL
Network. Accordingly, the Network's broadcasts likely result in a net
increase in viewership, because it makes more regular season games
available to consumers. Indeed, the Thursday night games would not
otherwise be available, since the "national-window games" and the
regional broadcast in teams' home markets are not affected. In other
words, when a game is televised on the NFL Network, consumers
outside the home markets of the two participating teams can gain
access-for a price-to a game that would normally be unavailable.
Before the NFL Network existed, Professor Ross applied a
similar analysis to the NFL's agreement with cable network ESPN.' 79
For an alleged Section 1 violation, the burden would likely be on the
plaintiff to show that absent the agreement at issue "the league or its
members would probably enter into an alternative contract (or
contracts) that would result in an increase in the number of persons
175. See NFL on Television - Wikipedia, supra note 174. All of these broadcasts
occur on Sundays: NBC's broadcast is on Sunday nights, and those of CBS and Fox are on
Sunday afternoons. The NFL's broadcast agreements are largely structured according to
conference. Id. CBS owns the broadcast rights to all games featuring American Football
Conference (AFC) teams, with Fox owning those featuring National Football Conference
(NFC) teams. Id. "Inter-conference games are broadcast by the network that is the normal
broadcast partner for the away team's conference." Id. As the broadcast partners of the two
conferences, CBS and Fox own what is similar to a residual interest in the conference
games. Id. Such rights, however, are subject to limited exceptions: NBC's Sunday night
game, ESPN's Monday Night Football, and the NFL Network's Thursday night package.
176. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 164. The exceptions are a few
Saturday night games following the end of the college football regular season.
177. See S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60.
178. See Ross, supra note 148, at 478-79.
179. See id.
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viewing the game."180 This might be a very difficult task, because it
requires more than just the existence of alternative outlets for the
broadcasts.18' Likewise, a plaintiff in an antitrust case against the
NFL would need to establish that, if the NFL Network was enjoined
from televising the games, it would be likely that other networks
would televise the games on a national scale. 182 Such a showing is
made even more difficult by the fact that there were very few
Thursday night games prior to the development of the NFL
Network. 183 To further strengthen its defense, the NFL could present
evidence showing that offers for the Thursday night package were
insufficient, and, but for the NFL Network, there would be no such
package at all. 84 With consumer welfare as the central focus of
antitrust law, it should make no difference whether the net increase in
viewership results from an independent cable network or the league-
owned network.
In rare circumstances, the magnitude of a particular game on
the NFL Network may present an exception to the foregoing analysis.
A highly anticipated game-one seen as more important than all the
other games in a given week-would likely draw offers from national
networks that would cancel out the net increase in viewership
normally provided by the Network. In other words, a particular
matchup may be so appealing that over-the-air networks would
provide free national broadcasts to consumers, which would obviously
180. Id. at 478.
181. Id.
182. See id. One could argue that there is a need to evaluate the effect on
viewership, if any, that would result from shifting the games currently shown on the NFL
Network to DirecTV's NFL Sunday Ticket package. This is unnecessary, however, when
one considers that the NFL Network is currently provided in DirecTVs basic channel
lineup at no additional cost to subscribers. See S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60, at 5-6. The
NFL Sunday Ticket package, on the other hand, is only available to DirecTV subscribers at
an additional fee. See id. Thus, such a move from the NFL Network to the NFL Sunday
Ticket package would actually reduce viewership. Furthermore, the NFL's contract with
DirecTV for the NFL Sunday Ticket package is set to expire after the 2010 season. NFL
Grants Five- Year Rights Extension to DirecTV for $3.5 Billion, BROADCAST ENGINEERING,
Nov. 12, 2004, http:/broadcastengineering.com/newsrooms/nfl-directv-extend-20041112/.
183. Prior to the NFL Network, the League typically scheduled one Thursday night
game to kickoff the regular season in September, and two games were typically played on
Thanksgiving Day (not in primetime). See, e.g., NFL.com, Schedules, http://www.nfl.com
/schedules?seasonType=REG&season=2002&week=-1#Week (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
184. See Ross, supra note 148, at 479 (focusing on competing offers from over-the-air
and cable networks, and concluding that the NFL could strengthen its defense by
"present[ing] internal documents or credible testimony showing that the network offers for
these selected games were unacceptably low and that, absent the [cable network's offer,] . .
- the NFL would have eliminated this mini-package of games").
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result in higher viewership.'8 5 The NFL confirmed this theory in the
last week of the 2007 regular season when it allowed a historic game,
originally scheduled for the NFL Network, to be simultaneously
broadcast by both NBC and CBS.186 Seen by 34.5 million viewers, the
game featured the New York Giants and the New England Patriots-
in an exciting fashion, the Patriots ultimately won, becoming only the
second team in NFL history to finish a regular season with an
undefeated record.18 7 To keep such a game on the NFL Network and
significantly reduce consumer access would eliminate the "net
viewership" justification outlined above.
The current dispute with Comcast leaves the NFL in a delicate
position regarding the NFL Network. Including the Network in basic
cable would likely alleviate most of the antitrust concerns discussed in
this Note.188 The current placement of the Network on a separate
sports programming tier on pay cable should lead the NFL to consider
the antitrust implications in future decisions regarding its Network.
As it stands now, the NFL Network maintains the potential to violate
antitrust law in the future. For example, if games on the Network
would likely be free national telecasts, the current justifications
weaken and ultimately disappear.18 9 Under such a circumstance,
keeping the games on the NFL Network would result in a substantial
reduction in viewership-and if games are not televised on the
Network to increase exposure, then it must be that the NFL has some
financial or other motive. It is this very scenario--"increase [in] the
profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer"°190-that antitrust
law seeks to prohibit.191
C. Proposed Solution to Address the NFL Network's
Antitrust Concerns
First, in order to increase consumer access and strengthen a
potential argument for exemption from antitrust liability under the
185. For the same reason, transferring the broadcast rights of NFL playoff and
championship games to a cable network would likely be an antitrust violation.
186. See Joseph M. Hanna, The NFL v. Cable Television: Which Heavyweight Will Be
Left Standing?, NYSBA PERSPECTIVE Spr. 2008, at 5, 5-6.
187. Id. While it may be an issue under the NFL Network's current arrangement, it
is unrealistic to suggest that the same would be true for a game scheduled on a basic cable
network like ESPN.
188. See generally Ross, supra note 148, at 489-91.
189. See id. at 490-91.
190. Id.
191. Id. (applying similar analysis to transfers of games to cable networks
generally).
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SBA, the NFL Network should make every reasonable effort in
dealing with Comcast to secure placement of the channel on the cable
provider's basic cable package. To enhance its bargaining position, the
Network has reportedly discussed the possibility of becoming a joint
venture with cable network ESPN.192 Yet the benefits of such a move
are anything but certain, as it will undoubtedly result in less control
and shared returns. Moreover, there is no guarantee that partnering
with ESPN will actually be effective in achieving basic cable carriage
for the NFL Network. Instead, the NFL should look to reduce the fee
it charges cable companies for the Network. 193 Granted, there is also
no guarantee that a price reduction will be effective, but it would aid
the NFL's cause in several respects. A cheaper fee would cut against
Comcast's biggest argument: that carriage of the Network would mean
added costs to consumers without commensurate benefits to them.
194
While a lower fee might lessen the Network's profitability, the NFL is
apparently willing to consider a joint venture that will have the same
result, and also give the NFL less control. In fact, the financial
benefits of such a move may outweigh the lost fees, because "[o]nce in
the basic [cable] package, the [NFL] would benefit from advertising
sales."195
Regardless of which cable package the NFL Network is offered,
there are two important factors that must remain constant: (1) the
Network's games should continue to be coupled with free over-the-air
local broadcasts in the home markets of both participating teams; and
(2) as long as the over-the-air networks are interested in purchasing
them, all playoff and championship games should be nationally
broadcast free to consumers. 196 If the NFL changes the supplemental
192. See, e.g., Brian Garrity & Peter Lauria, NFL Network, ESPN Huddle on Cable
TV Joint Venture, N.Y. POST, June 21, 2008, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven
/06212008/business/nfl-network espn-huddle on_cable tv joij 16516.htm.
193. According to cable companies, the NFL Network's current fee would cost eighty
cents per subscriber, putting it among the most expensive cable networks. S. Hrg. 109-762,
supra notes 60.
194. The NFL has argued that its fee is not too high because DirecTV and EchoStar
are able to carry the Network in their basic cable packages without increasing prices. See
id. at 6. The weakness of this argument lies in the exclusive nature of these providers,
which allows them to attract enough consumers to offset the costs. If the NFL Network was
more widely available, these providers would be unable to maintain their prices at the
current fee. See id. at 21-22.
195. LaRocca, supra note 12, at 88.
196. Because sports fans generally do not pay to watch televised games, there is
some disagreement on whether they should be considered the "consumers" in this analysis.
The only other approach, however, is to make advertisers the "consumers," which would
shift the focus from protecting consumer surplus, a fundamental purpose behind the
antitrust laws, to promoting the efficient allocation of resources. See Ross, supra note 148,
at 485-88.
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role assigned to the Network under the current television policy, it
does so at its own peril. Not only could such changes result in
antitrust liability by significantly reducing viewership, but they would
also give Congress a reason to limit or even eliminate the SBA
exemption. 197 Ideally, the NFL would like its Network to be included
on basic cable, which would effectively eliminate antitrust challenges.
Despite the NFL's massive bargaining power, however, the cable
companies are under no obligation to accept the League's demands.
As a result, the NFL should actively seek out policy alternatives to
address the antitrust issues surrounding the Network. In other
words, it would benefit the NFL to focus on what it can control. The
following proposals are provided under the assumption that the NFL
Network will remain on the additional pay-basis, sports programming
tier for the foreseeable future.
1. Flexible-Scheduling Policy for the NFL Network
The adoption of a flexible-scheduling policy for NFL Network
games could improve the League's position under federal antitrust law
by ensuring that the Network maintains a supplemental role in the
League's television policy. Flexible-scheduling (or a flex-schedule) is
not a new concept to the NFL, as the League currently employs such a
policy for Sunday night broadcasts on NBC during the final seven
weeks of the regular season. 198 Under the existing flex-schedule, the
NFL can move one game that was originally scheduled for Sunday
afternoon to the NBC broadcast slot in primetime. 99 This allows the
League to "ensurefl quality matchups on Sunday night ... and [gives]
surprise teams a chance to play their way onto primetime." 200  The
schedule includes a twelve-day notice format, which requires the NFL
to announce the scheduling changes no later than twelve days before
the affected game.20
1
197. See supra text accompanying notes 95-113.
198. NFL on Television - Wikipedia, supra note 174. The 2006 NFL regular season
was the first time a flexible-scheduling policy was implemented. See NFL.com, Flexible
Scheduling, http://www.nfl.com/schedules/tv/flexible (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
199. NFL.com, Flexible Scheduling, supra note 198. The NBC Sunday night game
has a scheduled start time of 8:15 p.m. EST. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. During the final week of the season, however, the NFL can "reschedule
games as late as six days before the contests so that as many of the television networks as
possible will be able to broadcast a game that has major playoff implications." NFL on
Television -Wikipedia, supra note 174. As part of their agreements with the NFL, CBS and
Fox are allowed to "protect" five games from being selected for the Sunday night slot,
allowing the networks to broadcast them as originally scheduled. See id.
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Unlike the NFL's existing flex-schedule for Sunday nights,
where the best matchups are chosen, this Note's proposed flex-
schedule for the NFL Network would select one of the least appealing
games in a given week. This may seem counterintuitive for a young
network with limited original programming, but the potential
antitrust consequences far outweigh any interests the NFL Network
may have in televising "national" games. This policy would provide
the NFL with flexibility, and enable it to avoid featuring games on the
Network that would otherwise be free national broadcasts. A flex-
schedule prevents a repeat of the problem caused by the 2007
Patriots-Giants game, and makes certain that the NFL Network is
always increasing net viewership. The NFL would have difficulty
maintaining the current "net viewership increase" justification if a
free over-the-air network was willing to nationally broadcast an NFL
Network game. 202 Thus, erring on the side of caution, any game that
could potentially be the marquee matchup of a given week should not
be selected for the Network.
Currently, the NFL Network's schedule of games is developed
prior to the season, and it can be very difficult to predict which games
will, in fact, be appealing at different points in the football season.203
Indeed, it was this very occurrence that caused the League to
implement its current flex-schedule for Sunday nights.204 Thus, the
League has clearly accepted that some games not originally thought to
have national appeal can end up being worthy of the Sunday-night
slot in primetime. There is nothing keeping these "surprisingly
popular" games from being scheduled on the NFL Network, thus
leaving open the potential for antitrust issues. The proposed flexible-
scheduling policy could be easily implemented to address this
vulnerability. Under the NFL's present contracts with CBS and Fox,
each game is given a grade-A, B, or C-to indicate the probable scope
of its consumer appeal. 20 5 The games receiving an A grade are likely
to be broadcast nationally; whereas, on the other end of the spectrum,
those games having a C grade are shown "only in the two teams' home
television markets."206 The NFL could simply utilize this existing
rating system and limit the type of games shown on the Network to
202. See supra text accompanying notes 180-91.
203. A preseason prediction for which late-season games will have playoff
implications seems especially difficult when one considers that the first game broadcast on
the NFL Network is not until Week 10 of the regular season.
204. See NFL.com, Flexible Scheduling, supra note 198.
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only those with C grades. As a result, net viewership is always
increased since, but for the NFL Network. the games would not
otherwise be available outside the teams' home markets.
2. The Pros and Cons of a Flex-Schedule
The proposed flexible-scheduling policy would likely have
several benefits. Most importantly, it would reduce the risk of
antitrust liability by ensuring that the NFL Network only increases
net viewership. It may also increase the Network's perceived
relevance by many consumers. For example, a viewer living outside
the home market of his favorite team may monitor the NFL Network
schedule more frequently under the proposed flexible-scheduling
policy. It gives viewers an incentive to pay attention because of the
possibility that their favorite teams will be featured on the Network in
a particular week.20 7 Another potential benefit of the proposed flex-
schedule is the resulting increased exposure of individual teams. Only
a limited number of games (less than 40 percent)208 can be free
national broadcasts each week, and there are often some games that
deserve more than home-market exposure but are passed over by
national networks for matchups likely to be more popular.209 Finally,
the proposed flex-schedule may allow the NFL Network's Thursday
night package to be expanded without attracting more antitrust
scrutiny. Because the flex-schedule would ensure that the Network
maintains a supplemental role to free over-the-air broadcasts, the
League could choose to broadcast more than eight games.210 Such a
move would not only increase exposure, but also put additional
pressure on cable providers to include the NFL Network in their basic
cable packages.
Of course, there are other potential concerns that the NFL may
need to address before implementing the flex-schedule, but none
appear to outweigh the aforementioned benefits of this proposed
policy. Perhaps the biggest concern is logistics: using a flex-schedule
for the NFL Network games would require drastic changes in game
207. Indeed, just by announcing the NFL Network games as they are selected, the
League can create opportunities to increase its Network's exposure throughout the regular
season.
208. There are generally thirteen or more NFL games per week during the regular
season, and only four to five are broadcast free over-the-air by either CBS, Fox, or NBC.
See generally NFL on Television - Wikipedia, supra note 174.
209. To use an example from the 2008 NFL season, the Detroit Lions made NFL
history by becoming the first team to finish a regular season with a record of 0-16.
210. Under the current policy, adding more games to the NFL Network would run
the risk of increased antitrust scrutiny. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89.
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times (shifting an affected game from Sunday afternoon to Thursday
night).211 The three-day change is significant, especially when one
considers that the current Sunday night flex-schedule merely delays
an affected game by a few hours. 212 The logistical impact of shifting
games to Thursday nights is not limited to the teams and fans.
Football teams are not the only parties that use NFL stadiums, and
the League could run into scheduling conflicts by changing the date of
a game. In fact, the NFL has alluded to logistical problems as a
reason for not extending its existing flexible-scheduling policy to the
Monday Night Football broadcasts on ESPN.
213
Certain measures-namely, extending the notice format and
preselecting "eligible" games-can be taken as part of the proposed
flexible-scheduling policy to avoid most of the logistical challenges
mentioned above. The existing flex-schedule has a twelve-day notice
format, but the proposed policy could use a thirty- or forty-five-day
period. Because the NFL Network would just be choosing from the C
games 2 4-rather than looking for the single most popular matchup
like the Sunday night flex-schedule-a longer notice format should be
workable. Similar schedule adjustments in college football have not
been problematic.215 To aid with venue conflicts, the NFL could
preselect two to three games-matchups likely to have a C grade-for
each scheduled broadcast on the NFL Network. Then only two or
three venues would need to keep the Thursday date open. With only a
limited amount of games being televised nationally each week of the
regular season, the preselection of games can limit potential logistical
problems while maintaining the flexibility afforded by the proposed
policy.
From a legal perspective, the proposed policy would not
immunize the NFL Network from antitrust liability. Rather, it would
211. See, e.g., Barry Jackson, Flex TV Scheduling Leaves NFL Game Up in the Air,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.miamiherald.com/sports/football]story
/790617.html.
212. NFL.com, Flexible Scheduling, supra note 198. Obviously shifting a game from
Sunday to the preceding Thursday (3 days earlier) would result in teams having less
preparation time and a shorter recovery period for that week; but, the same is true for a
Thursday night game scheduled before the season begins. Thus, it seems that by providing
teams with enough advance notice, the proposed flex-schedule could be designed to have no
greater impact on teams than existing Thursday night games.
213. Jackson, supra note 211.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
215. See, e.g., Wakeforestsports.cstv.com, Wake Forest-Baylor Football Game Moved
to August 28, http://wakeforestsports.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/051508aac.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009);
USF Sports Bulletin, More ESPN: USF- UConn Moved to Sunday,
http:/Iblogs.tampabay.com/usf/2008/04/more-espn-usf-u.html (Apr. 23, 2008).
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merely strengthen the Network's existing justifications under the rule
of reason test-namely, increased viewership. Hypothetically
speaking, there may be some situations where the proposed flex-
schedule would be unable to maintain a "viewership increase"
justification for the Network. For example, if the superstation TBS, a
network available on basic cable, made a competitive offer for the NFL
Network's Thursday night package, the aforementioned antitrust
justifications would be severely weakened. Keeping the games on the
Network would harm consumer welfare, because a basic cable network
like TBS would provide greater access and lower costs to consumers.
Even if the NFL moved the games back to Sundays, TBS would still
give the consumer access to an extra game he could not have viewed
otherwise.
216
Such a scenario is likely foreclosed, however, by the NFL's
current agreements with CBS and Fox. Each deal is structured
according to conference, allowing what is similar to a residual interest
in all AFC games to be owned by CBS and all NFC games to be owned
by Fox.217 With the exception of certain national broadcasts-NBC's
Sunday night game, ESPN's Monday Night Football, and the NFL
Network's Thursday night package-CBS and Fox are the exclusive
broadcast partners of the two conferences. 218 As a result, a decision by
the NFL to move the Network's games would trigger the residual
rights of either CBS or Fox, effectively preventing a transfer of the
Thursday night package. 21 9 Also, the sheer cost of bundled NFL
broadcast rights would likely deter basic cable networks' interest in
the Thursday night package, particularly since the proposed flex-
schedule would be used to avoid the most appealing games. Cable
network ESPN pays $1.1 billion annually for the NFL's Monday Night
Football package, which translates into more than $64 million per
game. 220 Surely the expense of NFL broadcast rights limits the
number of cable networks that are capable of making competitive
216. This is assuming, of course, that none of the games would be nationally
televised by a free over-the-air network.
217. See Wikipedia.org, NFL on Television, supra note 174.
218. See id.
219. The NFL should be able to determine whether the games will be played on
Thursday nights. By moving them back to Sunday, the League might be able to block a
transfer when it wants to keep the games on the Network but feels that its hand is being
forced by antitrust concerns.
220. John Consoli, NBC, ESPN Snap Up NFL Packages, ADWEEK, Apr. 19, 2005,
http://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-advertising/4153921-1.html. It is important to note
that the $1.1 billion annual payment covers certain other broadcast rights as well,
including the NFL PrimeTime pre-game show and the NFL Draft. Id. ESPN is in the
middle of an eight-year deal with the NFL that was signed in 2005. See id.
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offers for the NFL Network games. Moreover, the risk of this scenario
can be eliminated if the Network attains basic-cable carriage, because
consumers' access (in terms of viewership) would not change between
two basic cable networks.
Finally, in conjunction with the adoption of a flexible-
scheduling policy for NFL Network games, the NFL should thoroughly
document its decision-making process in order to effectively defend
against any alleged antitrust violations. 221 Proper documentation will
facilitate a showing that, due to the insufficiency of alternative offers,
the Thursday night package would not exist without the NFL
Network. 222 Such a showing can make it much more difficult for
plaintiffs to establish that the Network actually reduces viewership. 223
If the NFL can present evidence refuting the claims of potential
plaintiffs, it would go a long way in insulating the Network from
future antitrust scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
As professional sports leagues continue to develop their own
television networks, the antitrust issues they create under the
Sherman Act will become increasingly important in the sports
broadcasting industry. As the pioneer of such networks, the NFL
Network was developed as "an essential part of [the NFL's] long-term
strategy for maintaining the health of the sport of football, for
developing fans, and for increasing the avid interest of its current fans
in the sport."224 In the Network's brief six-year history it has been the
target of considerable antitrust scrutiny, drawing criticism from
Congress, cable providers, and even football fans. 225 As the NBA,
NHL, and MLB improve their own existing networks, they are
undoubtedly keeping a watchful eye on the NFL Network.
There are two primary antitrust issues for the NFL Network
and its counterparts: (1) whether they are exempt from antitrust
liability under the SBA; and (2) if not, whether they violate Section 1
of the Sherman Act. For the reasons outlined in Part III.A of this
Note, the television networks owned by professional sports leagues are
221. See Ross, supra note 148, at 477-80.
222. See id.
223. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 179-84.
224. See Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra
note 153.
225. See e.g., id.; S. Hrg. 109-762, supra note 60; KNOWLEDGE@EMORY, supra note 8;
see also LaRocca, supra note 12.
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probably beyond the scope of the SBA exemption and not immune
from antitrust liability. 226 For any cases involving alleged Section 1
violations of the Sherman Act by one of these league-owned networks,
the court will apply the rule of reason test, which the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized as the appropriate standard for sports-related
antitrust cases.227 A Section 1 violation under the Sherman Act
requires collective action and an improper purpose; however, ultimate
liability for the NFL Network or its counterparts will likely depend on
the final element: actual harm.228  Consistent with the Court's
treatment of the challenged television policy in NCAA v. Board of
Regents,229 actual harm can be characterized in terms of consumer
welfare by asking whether consumers' access to the programming (in
terms of viewership) has been reduced.
230
Essentially, a league-owned network that reduces consumer
access to the League's programming may constitute an illegal practice
in violation of the Sherman Act.231 The plaintiffs bear the burden,
however, of proving that viewership would likely be higher if the
League's network did not exist.232  Thus, the actual effect on
viewership necessarily depends on the existence of likely-and
superior-alternatives. 233  Certain factors of a professional sports
league-such as the amount of games available, consumer demand for
league programming, and the program carriage rights of the League's
network-could potentially influence what likely alternatives are
available, and thus ultimately impact the actual effect a league-owned
network has on viewership or consumer welfare.
234
In Part III.B of this Note, the rule of reason test was applied to
the NFL Network to determine whether it complied with antitrust
law. As a supplement to free over-the-air network programming, the
NFL Network probably does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act
because it actually enhances consumer welfare by making additional
access to NFL games available to consumers for a small fee.235 The
226. See supra text accompanying notes 127-37, 141-84.
227. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
229. See generally, NCAA, 468 U.S. 85.
230. See Ross, supra note 148, at 478-79; see also supra text accompanying notes
164-67.
231. See generally Ross, supra note 148, at 478-79.
232. Id. at 478-79.
233. See id.
234. For example, the large number of games featured by the NBA or MLB relative
to the NFL would likely make it easier for their networks (NBA TV and the MLB Network,
respectively) to maintain a role as a supplement to free over-the-air broadcasts.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79.
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level of free consumer access is unaffected; the same number of games
will be broadcast free over-the-air whether the NFL Network televises
its eight game package or not. 236 Therefore, the consumer's position
does not change, except that the NFL Network now offers him the
option of purchasing additional access to an extra eight games over
the course of the regular season.
Until the NFL Network can achieve basic cable carriage, one
caveat remains: consumer access should never be reduced as a result
of the Network. This would most likely occur where the NFL Network
televises a game that would otherwise be a free national broadcast.
By adopting the proposed flexible-scheduling policy, the NFL could
boost the supplemental role of its Network while simultaneously
alleviating antitrust concerns. It could utilize the existing grading
system for games to maintain a net viewership increase and provide
much-needed flexibility in the Network's broadcast schedule. The
proposed flexible-scheduling policy can do more than strengthen the
NFL Network's defense against future antitrust challenges; it has the
potential to assist the Network in blazing the trail for other
professional sports leagues as they develop the next generation of
sports broadcasting.
Ethan Flatt*
236. The games will still be televised for free in the teams' home markets, and there
will still be a national broadcast from CBS, NBC, and Fox. See supra text accompanying
notes 177-79.
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